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ABSTRACT
Three main hypotheses are proposed to explain the male marriage premium. They are
marriage selection hypothesis, male-female labor specialization hypothesis and simply
discrimination. This paper tries to test if marriage selection hypothesis explains the male
marriage premium. The effect of marriage selection, which means males with higher
productivity have higher possibility to be chosen into marriage, should be positively
correlated to the marriage market competition level in the area and thus in area with
higher marriage market competition, a higher density of high productivity males should
be observed among married males. On the other hand, the labor specialization is a postmarriage process and should have no relationship with marriage market competition. This
difference can be tested to achieve the main purpose of the paper. After analyze the 20052012 ACS data, we find a positive correlation between marriage market competition and
density of high productivity males. Marriage selection hypothesis explains the marriage
premium.
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Introduction and Literature Review

It has been long noticed that a wage gap exists between married and unmarried males. This male
marriage premium exists in a lot of empirical works using dierent datasets, and this phenomenon
raises wide interests.
Hill's research (1979) nds that married men have higher wages than males with any other
marriage status, using data from the 1976 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The marriage premium
is between 26% to 31% for white man and 22% to 27% for black man. Also, she reports that married
males spend more time on job training than unmarried males. Bartlett and Callahan (1984), nd
that married males earn about 25% higher wage than unmarried males, after analyzing data from
National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men. In the work of Schoeni (1990), the marriage premiums
are estimated in 12 dierent countries and the estimated marriage premiums are from 3% to 32%.
The common characteristic of these researches is that they all use a wage determination model with
a set of variables representing productivity and a marriage status dummy.

The coecient of the

dummy estimates the marriage premium.
Three main hypotheses are established to explain male marriage premium: marriage selection
hypothesis, family labor specialization hypothesis and discrimination hypothesis.
In the marriage selection hypothesis, we assume a selection exists when females choose their
spouses and thus only productive males with higher wage get married, leaving those unproductive
and low-income males single. This hypothesis also implies that some attributes that have positive
eects in marriage market are positive in labor market as well.

For example, some abilities like

social communication ability and the degree of cooperating are helpful for a man to nd a spouse
in marriage market, and are also helpful to get a higher salary in labor market. Under marriage
selection hypothesis, marriage has no causal eect on wage, but inverse, productivity or wage has
causal eect on marriage. That means the ability of a man is highly correlated with marriage status,
and correlated with income wage as well.
On the other hand, the male-female labor specialization hypothesis assumes marriage is the
causal eect of being more productive and having higher income wage. The hypothesis behind is
well known as Becker's (1975) Theory of Family.

The theory postulates that labor specialization

occurs between husband and wife in a marriage, and thus the married male has less opportunity
cost to invest in human capital than those who are single.
Sanders Korenman and David Neumark (1991) have done an extraordinary work on empirical
test for the marriage selection hypothesis.

Noticing in labor specialization hypothesis, the wage

increase is caused by human capital accumulation, which is a time consuming process.

And in

marriage selection hypothesis, atrributes that make males competitive in marriage market as well as
labor market have high possibility to be time xed. The unobservable time xed attribute is added
to the model and by subtracting the average value of each variable over time, the time xed variable
is canceled out, and the model is successfully estimated.

Using a time xed attribution model,

Korenman and Neumark reduce the marriage status coecient by nearly 50%.

The signicant

reduction is consistent with the hypothesis.
The main drawback of Sanders Korenman and David Neumark's method is the need for further
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discussion of the time invariance of these unobservable characteristics.

Also, the model cannot

control for employer's favor of married males, or, the discrimination.
Christopher Dougherty (2006) argued that the behaviors of young people are noticeably dierent
from those of mature adults and thus those unobservable characteristics are not time xed.

An

alternative model is established and estimated to capture this maturity process. The model uses
a set of dummy variables to indicate the number of years before or after the marriage. The result
of his research shows that, the premium is attributable to an unobserved time distributed eect
that emerges and grows with the approach of marriage and continues to grow for some years after
marriage. This model is very clever and applicable. The model is easy to estimate and the result
from this model is highly consistent with intuitive deductions.
A more detailed eort is done by Eng Seng Loh (1996), in which the author tests the Becker's
(1975) theory of family.

Becker's theory implies men will have a higher wage premium from his

nonworking wife than from a working wife.

The result shows that, the size of wage premium

does not vary from wife's labor supply decision. Also, Loh compares the wage dierence between
married self-employed male and unmarried self-employed male, so that the employers' discrimination
is eliminated. The result shows married self-employed male earns less than unmarried self-employed
male which implies no productivity dierence among married and unmarried males. Another test
Loh conducts is comparing wage premium between males that cohabitate with their wives with
those do not. The result shows no premium variance among these two groups. Each of the results
violates Becker's family specialization and human capital accumulation theory. The source of this
marriage premium is not likely from productivity dierence.

This result is astonishing, because

under classical economic assumptions, employers are rational and thus wage rate should only be
determined by marginal productivity. The model Loh uses does not fully control the productivity
and thus has biasness problem.
In an elaborated research conducted by Cornaglia and Feldman (2010), they use hand-collected
longitude data of baseball players to perform the test of those hypotheses. The advantage of using data of baseball players is that baseball industry has a long history of statistics collection and
numerous direct measurements of productivity.

Also performance in baseball is directly quanti-

able and with a number of measures that are relatively independent of the actions of the player's
teammates.

In their result, no robust statistically signicant eect on productivity is found and

even when controlling for the productivity directly in the earning equation, the marriage premium
remains positive and statistically signicant with a value of 20%. Employers may discriminate in
favor of married players. However, the nature of this discrimination still needs investigation. They
also nd evidence that the team's wining chance is positively correlated with married players' ratio.
Employers may discriminate in favor of married players because they lead to overall greater team
success that is not necessarily captured by the productivity measures. In this context, the marriage
premium should attribute to unobserved characteristics that married people tend to possess and are
highly valued in labor market as well as in marriage market.
As shown above, the key to nd sources of marriage premium is to nd the proper wage determination equation. Once the variables are well controlled, the source of marriage premium is obvious.
Two major diculties exist on modeling this problem. First, productivity is not well dened and
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hard to measure. The usual way to model wage determination is using experience, education, training and several demographic characteristics to proxy for productivity. A more reliable method is to
limit the research to athletics, thus the productivity is well dened and monitored. However, as in
Cornaglia and Feldman's (2010), even in such a well-dened context, it is hard to specify the productivity. Second, some characteristics that are important to wage determination are not observable
or measurable, thus elaborative work should be done to cover these variables in the model.

2

Methodology

Because of the diculty in constructing an unbiased wage determination model, the researches
dedicated to quantitatively estimate how much a hypothesis does explain the marriage premium
should be thrown doubt upon. The inevitable biasness suered by all models makes many of these
estimations biased, unless the method the research uses is biasness insensitive, or the research's goal
is to qualitatively test the hypotheses. In this article, we avoid using wage regression as the main
method and instead of testing the hypotheses quantitatively, we qualitatively test these hypotheses
using a method described below.

2.1

Method Description

We rst made a hypothesis that both the marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis
are not true, which means not only women do not care about the productivity level of male when
choosing their spouses but also marriage does not make males more specialized or become more
productivity. For the conciseness, we call it Hypothesis I. Because marriage has no selection eect on
males' productivity, the marriage market will generate a population of married males just as a process
to generate a random subsample from the whole male population. These two samples should share
exactly same characteristics such as the same male productivity distribution. Because we also assume
marriage will not make males more specialized or more productive, no post-marriage eect will occur
to cause any shift in this distribution.

Under Hypothesis I, the males' productivity distribution

should be same between the whole male population sample and the married male subsample. If this
is consistent with the data we have, we do not reject Hypothesis I, both hypotheses do not explain
the marriage premium; however if we observe dierent distribution of males' productivity between
the whole male population sample and the married male subsample, we reject the Hypothesis I and
should have further tests about the remaining three situations (hypotheses): rst, both marriage
selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis are true; second, only selection hypothesis is true;
third, only specialization hypothesis is true.
Actually, as will be shown in the following part of this article, the data shows a higher density
of high productivity male in married population than in the whole population.

Further tests are

needed. To conduct further tests, we should analyze how the distribution of males' productivity is
dierent from each other under each hypothesis. The analysis starts with nding the exact eects
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to cause this distribution dierence.
Both two hypotheses predict a higher density of high productivity males in married population.
The marriage selection, which has the Marriage Selection Eect, will causes married population
to have a higher density of high productivity males, because higher productivity male has higher
possibility to get married due to the females' preference over higher productivity males. The labor
specialization, which has Labor Specialization Eect, causes males become more productive workers
after marriage because married males can be more specialized in their labor market jobs and have
less opportunity cost to accumulate their human capitals. This will also make married population
to have a higher density of high productivity males. However, the specialization happens only after
marriage. It is totally a post-marriage process, and marriage market behavior should have no eect
on it.

On the other hand, the marriage selection is a marriage market behavior and in dierent

marriage market with dierent marriage market characteristics, dierent Marriage Selection Eect
should be observed. Consider the following Statement: the Marriage Selection Eect is one of the
consequences of marriage market competition; thus the level of competition is positively related to
the Marriage Selection Eect. This Statement can be used to test which Eect is the reason of the
male's productivity distribution dierence.
First, one thing should be claried here is that, by saying males' productivity distribution, we
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mean the distributions as shown in Figure 1 .

The horizontal axis is the productivity level, and

the vertical axis is the percentage in the population (density). For the demonstration convenience,
we suppose our male population is divided into four groups by their productivity level. In Figure
1, the red line represents productivity distribution in total population, and the blue line represents
the productivity distribution in married population.

We would like to call the red line Neutral

Distribution (ND) and the blue line Observed distribution (OD). By using the word neutral
we hope to denote a distribution under no marriage selection or labor specialization eect; and by
using the word observed we hope to denote the observed distribution in the real world, under
the eect of marriage selection and labor specialization. The eect of marriage selection or labor
specialization can be represented by the degree of shifting from ND to OD. In Figure 1(a), the
ND and OD overlapping with each other which means the population is not under the Marriage
Selection or Labor Specialization Eect (the Eect for conciseness). In Figure 1(b), the OD diers
from the ND, with a higher percentage population on the right ends. This shows existence of the
Eect. Figure 1(c) which has the same ND as (b) exhibits a similar pattern but has dierent degree
of shifting. This means a dierent level of Eects exist in the population. In Figure 1(d), both ND
and OD are dierent from those in (b). Thus, dierent Marriage Selection or Labor Specialization
Eect can be shown in dierent sets of these kinds of gures. However using such gures makes it
dicult to tell the level of the Eects. The level of the Eects is not only decided by the shape of
OD, but also inuenced by the shape of ND. That means the same Selection or Specialization Eect
will produce dierent sets of gures due to the dierent population structure. Also, the degree of
shifting is hard to properly measure.
Because of the diculties mentioned above, we would like to have another tool to represent the

1 Figure

1 is made up for the convenience of illustration and is not based on any existing data.
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Figure 1

Eect. Figure 2(a)

2 shows a promising tool: Standardized Marriage Rate Curve (SMRC). As shown

in the Figure, the curve's horizontal axis is productivity level and the vertical axis is Standardized
Marriage Rate (SMR), which is the marriage rate in the productivity group divided by the marriage
rate in total population. For example, if the marriage rate in the rst productivity group is 0.7, and
the marriage rate of total population is 0.35, the Standardized Marriage Rate of the rst productivity
group is 2. As in this example, the Standardized Marriage Rate could exceed 1, and this means the
marriage rate in that group exceeds the marriage rate in the total population. The reason why we
standardize marriage rate can be illustrated in Figure 2(b). In this gure, line a and b are two nonstandardized marriage rate curves observed in two populations with total marriage rate 0.4 and 0.6.
The at patterns of the marriage rate curves are evidence that both the populations are not under
the Eect. A good tool to represent the eect should give these two populations the same curve,
just as line c, the completely overlapping marriage rate curves after we standardize the marriage
rate in both populations. The advantage to use SMRC to represent the Eect is obvious. First, for
given ND and OD, no matter what marriage rate is in total population, the corresponding SMRC is
always the same. Second, for a given ND and dierent OD, no matter what marriage rate is in total
population, the corresponding SMRC will always be dierent. Third, For dierent ND and a given
OD, no matter what marriage rate is in total population, the corresponding SMRC will always be
dierent. Forth, if one or more than one groups are with SMRs greater than 1, here must be at least

2 Figure

2 is made up for the convenience of illustration and is not based on any existing data.
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Figure 2

one group with SMR less than 1. The rst three properties ensure any Eect can be unambiguously
dened by an SMRC and because of the forth one, we can conveniently only focus on the groups
with SMRs greater than 1 to measure the level of the Eect.
Once we agree on using SMRC to represent the Eect, we can start nding the measurement of
the level of the Eect and then use the Statement mentioned in previous paragraph to test marriage
selection hypothesis. The level of the Eect should be evaluated from two respects: rst, in what
productivity groups of the SMRC have SMRs greater than 1, and second, how much these SMRs
are dierent from 1. For example, in Figure 2(b) line c, no group's SMR diers from 1 and thus
no Selection or Specialization Eect exists in this situation. In Figure 2(c), the third and fourth
groups of each line have SMRs greater than 1 and the rst and second groups have SMRs less tha
1. Also, in Figure 2(c) line c, the dierences betweem SMR and 1 are greater than those in Figure
2(c) line b, thus the level of the Eect in line c is greater than that in line b. However, diculties
to compare the levels of the Eects still exist, if consider the following situation. In Figure 2(d),
the line d has an SMRC with a higher far right end (the fourth group value), and the line b has an
SMRC with a higher third group height and a lower far right end. It is hard for us to compare the
levels of the Eects in these two lines. Thus, for simplicity reason, we only divide our population
into two groups and the diculty described above can be avoided. The drawback of this method is
the cuto value to divide our population is arbitrary, and how this arbitrarily selected cuto value
will aect our testing result is hard to predict. So, to avoid disturbance caused by this arbitrary
cuto value, we use ve dierent cuto values ranging in an interval centered with the mean value
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of the productivity in population.
Now we can start introducing the method more specically. We can divide our data by states
and years, and these divisions naturally create several experiment groups for our tests.

Then we

continue to divide our experiment groups into high productivity group and low productivity group,
by using a cuto value of productivity. For conciseness, we use the name Hypothesis I to call the
hypothesis that both the marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis are not true.
To test the Hypothesis I, we could test whether the population is under the inuence of Marriage
Selection or Labor Specialization Eect (the Eect). The evidence of the existence of such Eect is
that, the SMR is greater than 1 in the higher productivity group. If we nd no such evidence, we
do not reject Hypothesis I and we conclude that neither the marriage selection hypothesis nor the
specialization hypothesis explains the marriage premium. If nd such evidence, then we reject the
Hypothesis I and continue testing which hypothesis explains the marriage premium. This is the step
one of our tests. The data shows a greater than 1 SMR in high productivity group and this means
Hypothesis I should be rejected. Then we continue testing which hypothesis explains the marriage
premium by nding the source of the Eect. Noticing that if marriage selection does explain the
marriage premium, the level of marriage market competition is positively related to the level of the
Eect.

This means the dierence between SMR and 1 will be greater in the experiment groups

with higher level of marriage market competition. If we do not observe such relationship, we can
conclude that marriage selection does not explain marriage premium and only labor specialization
explains the premium. If we do observe such relationship, we could conclude the marriage selection
hypothesis explains the marriage premium.
However, two measurement problems still exist in this method, even after we successfully measure
the level of Selection or Specialization Eect.

First, how can we measure the productivity as a

comparable variable over time and space (states)? Second, how can we measure the marriage market
competition level? These two problems will be discussed in the following Section.

2.2

Measurement of Productivity

Productivity cannot be directly observed in most situations. We have to nd indicators to represent
dierent levels of productivity. However, the choice of indicators should be prudent. For example, if
we measure productivity with a set of personal characteristics such as education level and experience,
how we compare the productivity of two males becomes a problem. We can hardly tell which one
is more productivity among a male with 10 years' education and 7 years' working experience and a
male with 7 years' education and 10 years' working experience.
In competitive markets, one's wage rate should always be equal to marginal productivity. Thus,
the wage rate seems to be a promising measurement of productivity. However, new problem occurs
when using wage rate, the price of labor, to measure the productivity. We need our measurement
can be compared across time and space, a property that the nominal price does not possess.

To

compare the price level over time, the standard method is the CPI adjustment and CPI is ocially
reported every year by Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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To compare the price over space, we can use a similar method to adjust price level into comparable
variable in each state. Lots of studies have been conducted to nd such an adjustment method. In
a joint project conducted by Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), Aten (2005, 2006) for the rst time estimates such a method called regional price parities
(RPPs) in for 38 large metropolitan and non-metropolitan, but urban, areas of the United States
for 2003 and 2004.

Aten (2007) extends his estimation into remaining areas using a multistage

approach.
In our article, we rst use CPI adjustment to convert wage rate in each year to 2004, the year
Aten's estimation is based on.

Then using the estimation results from Aten (2007), we convert

the time comparable wage rate into time-space comparable wage rate. Once the wage rate can be
compared over time and space, the same wage rate in dierent states and years now can represent
the same productivity level.

2.3
2.3.1

Describe Marriage Market Competition
Availability Ratio

To properly describe marriage market competition in an area, two sets of indicators can be used.
The rst is Sex Ratio (SR); the second is Availability Ratio (AR), according to the research of
Goldman, Westo and Hammerslough (1984).

Availability Ratio estimates the availability of a

person's potential mates in the population, which is built under the concept that a perfectly matched
marriage market should contain not only the same number of males and females but also proper
structure of males and females. A young man aged 22 has very little chance to get married to a
woman aged 60 even though the marriage market is very competitive for male. The AR takes these
marriage pattern into consideration. Specically, for a male (say A) in the population, his AR is
computed as following:

Availability Ratio =

N umber of suitable women f or A
Average N umber of Suitable M en f or A's Suitable women

In a perfectly matched marriage market, everyone's AR is unity. A greater than one AR means the
marriage competition faced by a person is low; a less than one AR means the competition is high.
The reason why use two sets of indicators is because the marriage market is not a well-behaved
market that is ruled by classical economics market laws. The marriage market, or the marriage pool,
more precisely, is not completely ruled by law of supply and demand. Many studies, such as Schwartz
(2005), Qian (1999), have found assortative pattern in marriage. This pattern implies interracial,
inter-educational marriages rarely happen. This pattern not only exists in the USA, but also exists
in other countries, such as Canada (Hou and Myles, 2011).

However, Qian and Lichter (2011),

Tucker and Kernan (1990) show this pattern does gradually shift over time. Thus, it is natural to
question, whether the marriage pattern shifts in under dierent marriage market circumstance. For
example, suppose a marriage pattern exists in a certain area. The pattern indicates a group of
people are more likely to get married with another group of people. The marriage that does not t
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the pattern is rare. Specically speaking, suppose the marriage pattern shows that, high educated
young women is more likely to marry to high educated young men, but will this pattern change
when a war happens and the number of young men in population decrease dramatically? Will there
be more marriages between high educated young women and low educated elder men? If it will, the

3

marriage market shows well behaved economics characteristics, and then the Sex Ratio , other than
Availability Ratio, is a better indicator of marriage market competition; if it will not, the marriage
pool is stubborn on its own pattern, and the Availability Ratio is the better indicator. Also, the
fact that the correlation coecient of Availability Ratio and Sex Ratio is only -0.019, means these
two indicators are not linearly interchangeable and at least one of them is not a good indicator for
marriage market competition.
More research is needed to conrm whether the marriage pattern is stubborn or not. To conduct
such researches, data containing rst marriage information is needed. Due to the data unavailability,
a formal conrmation of such stubbornness will not be included in this article. Two variables are
both used as indicators of marriage competition to cover the entire situation in reality.
To compute Available Ratio for a person, we should rst dene the word suitable.

In the

population, only a certain group of people who satisfy a set of constraints will be considered as
suitable for a particular person with particular characteristics.

For example, for a 45 years old

single man with PhD degree, a single woman aged 40 with master's degree is considered as suitable,
while a 16 years old single woman with high school diploma and a married woman aged 70 with
master's degree are both considered as not suitable.

The constraints discussed in this article are

age, race, geographic location, education, marital status, and eligibility. The criterion for setting a
constraint is simple. The set constraint should cover at least 90% (or 85%, in some situations) of
observed existing marriage after excluding the least possible marriage combinations. For example,
100 forty-year-old men get married this year, their wives are aged from 20-50.

Only 5 of them

married women less than 22 and 5 of them married women over 46. Excluding these two marriage
combinations will make our constraint cover 90% of the observed marriages last year, and exclude
any more other marriage combinations will make the coverage less than 90%. So the age constraint
for a forty-year-old man is 22 to 46.

2.3.2

Education Constraint

Due to the data availability, in this article we can only fully discuss the constraint on education.
Other constraints are detailed discussed by Goldman, Westo and Hammerslough (1984).
Table 1 shows the number of marriages observed for each education combination. Education levels
are sorted into 8 groups as 1-under middle school, "2-middle school or high school un-graduated or
GED", "3-high school diploma", "4-collage un-graduated", "5-bachelor", "6-master", "7-doctoral,
"8-professional education".

3

Number of males over Number of females in this article

9

Table 1

Table 2
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Table 3

Table 4

Table 2 shows relative frequency of man's education level for woman's education group. This table
can be used to help setting the education constraint on women. According to the criterion introduced
above, the constraints are shown in Table 3 and Table 4, using dierent coverage percentage level.
In the tables, the marriage combinations that are regarded as suitable under the constraint are
marked with 1 (green slots) and the unsuitable combinations are marked with 0 (yellow slots).
Similarly, Table 5 and Table 6 show the men's constraints under dierent coverage percentage level.
These tables map out the entire suitable mate set for people of each education level. For example,
using 85% coverage level, from Table 4, a man with education level 4 is suitable for women with
education level 2, 3, 4 and 5; from table 6, a womnn with education level 6 is suitable for men with
education 5, 6, 7 and 8.
This diagonal shape result is highly consistent with the result of Goldman, Westo and Hammerslough (1984). They use another set of criteria to derive the constraint matrix, which is also diagonal.
In their research, they preset several rules to capture the education constraint and then check the
coverage of observed marriage under each rule and then decide the best rule for constructing the

11

Table 5

Table 6
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constraint.

2.3.3

Other Constraints

Age, marital status, and eligibility are also constraints which should be considered when dening
suitable mates.

Marital Status

In this article, divorced, widowed and all other marital statuses other than married, spouse present
are regarded as single. And only single people are in the marriage market. This simplication may
bring constraints missing problem. Widowed or divorced person may be more likely to remarry to
a person with a similar marital status than to married to a single, never married person. Without
further discussion about the risk of this simplication, the possibility to overestimate Availability
Ratio cannot be eliminated. Also, couples bounded by a non-ocial marriage form, such as cohabitant which has theoretically same eect as marriage, should be excluded from marriage pool. But
these couples will report themselves as single in the data. This missing information will again cause
over estimation in AR.

As the non-availability of detailed marriage data, this article will use Goldman's results about
age and eligibility. The following part is a brief summary of that research.

Age

Age constraints for male and female are displayed in the Figure 3.

As shown in the gure, both

lower bound and higher bound of male's constraint are lower than those of female's. Also, people
younger than 16 and older than 75 are considered as too young or too old and are excluded from
marriage market.

Eligibility

Unmarried homosexuals, conrmed bachelors, and all others with characteristics that would make
them ineligible to get into marriage market should be excluded.

Census data of 1980 shows rst

marriage rarely occurs after age 45. People elder than 45 and single without having any previous
marriage are highly unlikely to get married in the later ages.
marriage market.
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So these people are excluded from

2.4

The Summary of Testing Procedure

After solving the two measurement problems, we can now state our testing method in a step by step
procedure.
Step 1, Divide the data-set into dierent experiment groups by years and states and compute
necessary variables in each experiment group:

Availability Ratio (AR) and Average Availability

Ratio, Sex Ratio, Time-Space Comparable Income Wage, and SMRs. Then divide each experiment
group into high productivity group and low productivity group by a Time-Space Comparable Log
Income Wage Cuto Value.
Step 2, Testing the Hypothesis I: Both marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis
are not true. If in the high productivity group the SMR is greater than 1, we reject Hypothesis I
and continue to Step 3. If it is not, we do not reject Hypothesis I and our conclusion will be both
marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis do not explain the marriage premium.
Step 3, Testing the Hypothesis II: The marriage selection hypothesis does not explain the marriage premium but the labor specialization hypothesis does explain the marriage premium. If in high
productivity group the dierence between SMR and 1 has no correlation with AR or SR, which are
measurements of marriage market competition, we do not reject Hypothesis II. We conclude that,
the marriage selection hypothesis does not explain the marriage premium but the labor specialization hypothesis does explain the marriage premium in this situation. If the dierence has positive
relationship with AR or SR, we reject the Hypothesis II and we need have more discussion about
testing the correctness of labor specialization hypothesis before we draw a nal conclusion.

3

Data

To conduct the analysis, I use the 2005-2012 ACS Data. The full dataset has 24,160,907 observations.
Due to the computation power limitation, containing too many observations will make it hard to
compute Availability Ratio, and thus a 20% subsample is randomly drawn from the full dataset. In
this subsample, 4,836,024 observations are drawn. These observations are divided into 408 groups
by year and states (51 states and 8 years). According to our research purpose, people whose races
are not white, and working places are outside US or in Puerto Rico, are omitted from the sample.
Also, individuals with missing values on important variables such as wage, work place, education
level are omitted. After omitting observations that are out of our interest, or with missing variables
values, we have 1,728,682 observations remaining.
AR is computed for every unmarried eligible person in dataset. For each year of each state, an
average AR is computed to indicate the marriage market competition level in that area that year.
Listing these results will be not interesting because the data contains information in 8 years and 51
states (no information on Alaska), which means 408 groups exist and each group has its own results.
As mentioned above, we omit observations with missing value on important variables. However,
omitting and selecting will cause information lost or even structural change in data. Thus, variables
should be calculated before we delete any observations. In our research, 4 variables are computed

14

from original data: Sex Ratio in each state, time-space comparable wage rate, Availability Ratio for
each unmarried eligible person, SMRs. The rst two variables are calculated before any omitting and
selecting. However, to successfully compute Availability Ratio, we need information about people's
age, race, and education level. People with these missing values on these variables are impossible
for us to compute Availability Ratio, thus it is computed in the selected sample. But this should
not be a major problem in this research because only 3.45% people are with missing information in
age, race or education. The problem is more noticeable when we compute the SMRs, which requires
income or wage information. 20.07% observations in our sample have no information on wage or
income. Some structural changes occur after we delete those observations and the impact should be
noted here.
The original data is composed of 48.57% males and 51.43% females; in the data after omitting,
these numbers become 51.91% and 48.09%. The change is signicant. But luckily, this sex structural
change will only aect the Sex Ratio computation in our research, and the Sex Ratio is computed
before we omitting any observations. Also, among those who are with no wage information, 72.96%
are under middle school education, thus we can expect a relatively low wage rate among these people.
And 99.95% of them are single. Considering these two facts, omitting those observations from our
sample will cause an upward SMR bias in low productivity group and downward bias in the high
productivity group because those observations are all unmarried people with low education level.
These biases may aect our test results in Step 2. One simple way to x this problem is to assume
those observations with less than middle school are all with low income (thus will be grouped into
low productivity group), because they are all single and low educated. One risk to use this method
is we may over adjust the data because we are not 100% sure that those people will all be sorted
into low productivity group. In particular, this risk will become higher when our cuto value is at
the lower or upper bound of its range.

At the lower bound, we may sort too many observations

into low productivity group and at the upper bound we may sort too many observations into high
productivity group.

4

Result

In Step 1, Availability Ratio, Sex Ratio, and SMR are computed in every 408 groups by year and
states. Listing this result here will be not interesting. Descriptive statistics result is as following.
As mentioned in Section 2, we use the dierence between SMR and 1 to measure the Eect of
Marriage Selection or Labor Specialization, thus we use Variable SMR-1 to conduct our tests. Using
these results, we can conduct the test in Step 2. Our null hypothesis is the mean of SMR-1 in high
productivity group is 0. The t-statistics and p-values for the tests under each log wage cuto value
are shown below.
As shown in the table, in all settings of cuto values, the mean of SMR-1 is signicantly greater
than zero and thus we need to have more discussion about which hypothesis is true, between marriage
selection hypothesis and Labor specialization hypothesis. This requires us to nd the relationship
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Table 7

Table 8
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Table 9

between SMR-1 and SR or Average AR. To nd the true relationship between these variables,
correlation coecients are calculated not only between SMR-1 and SR or Average AR but also
between the other forms of SMR-1 (square and square root) and other forms of SR or Average AR
(square and square root). Before we actually calculate the correlation coecients, outliers should
be omitted.

Figure 4 and Table 9 show the descriptive statistics of SMR-1 and how outliers are

omitted.

After omitting the outliers, the correlation coecient matrix is listed in Table 10. In the matrix,
correlation coecients greater than 0.10 are marked with asterisks.

The corresponding variables

behind these coecients may have strong correlation. To have clearer results, regressions have been
pairwise conducted between all variables. The estimated slope coecients are shown in Table 11.
The regression coecients which are signicant at 5% signicance level have been marked with
asterisks.
The regression results are dierent under dierent cuto values. Positive correlations exist between SR (and its other forms) and SMR-1 (and its other forms) at 2.5 and 3.0 cuto values. Under
cuto values of 1.5, 2.0 and 3.5, no strong correlation is found. As mentioned in Section 3, the over
adjusting risk will be higher when cuto value is at its lower and upper bound and thus the results
under 2.5 and 3.0 cuto values are more reliable than results under other cuto values, which means
SR have positive correlation with SMR-1.
However, the results also show that AR has no strong correlation with SMR-1, and this makes
the situation complicated. As mentioned in Section 2, because we do not know whether AR or SR
is the better indicator of marriage market competition, we need to carefully interpret our result. If
SR is the proper indicator of marriage market competition, our result shows a positive correlation
between marriage market competition and the level of the Eect, which means the source of the
Eect is marriage selection.

Marriage Selection hypothesis explains the male marriage premium.

However, if AR, not SR, is the proper indicator of marriage market competition and SR is irrelevant
with marriage competition, more discussion is needed to draw a nal conclusion.
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Figure 3

As mentioned in section 2, the Eect can only be the result of three sources: marriage selection,
human capital accumulation from labor specialization, and discrimination. If AR is the good indicator of marriage competition, which implies SR is not a good indicator, the Eect can not be resulted
from marriage selection because no relationship between the level of the eect and the marriage
competition is found. Also, under the classical economics assumptions, discrimination is also not
a promising source of the Eect because employers are supposed to be rational and discriminating
on employee's marital status will not maximize their prots. The only possible source of the Eect
is Labor Specialization. However, the positive relationship between SR and the level of the Eect
must be explained before we accept this statement. If we accept this statement, the human capital accumulation caused by labor specialization after marriage is positively correlated with SR, a
variable that is not an indicator of marriage competition.
This wired correlation between the human capital accumulation and SR makes the statement not
convincing. According to the labor specialization hypothesis, the human capital accumulation is the
result of labor specialization between husbands and wives. Thus the positive correlation between
the human capital accumulation and Sex Ratio should be explained by the correlation between the
degree of specialization and Sex Ratio. According to the Beckers' Theory of the Family, husband
and wives specialize in dierent kinds of works because their opportunity costs will be minimized if
do so. How the Sex Ratio, which is not an indicator of marriage market competition, will aect the
opportunity cost of human capital investment is very hard to imagine.
As argued above, the positive correlation we observed between SR and the level of the Eect is
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Table 11

20

wired if SR is not a good indicator of marriage market competition, and thus we tend to believe
SR is a good indicator of marriage market competition. Honestly speaking, this belief we hold is
not rigorously proved and due to the data availability constraint, we can not have a whole section
to argue for this belief.

However, if we accept this belief, the marriage selection hypothesis does

explain the marriage premium.

5

Conclusion
After solving some measurement problems, including nding the measurement of productivity

(the Time-Space Comparable Wage), nding the indicator of marriage market competition (Availability Ratio and Sex Ratio), dening and nding the measurement of Marriage Selection or Labor
Specialization Eect (the dierence between Standardized Marriage Rate and 1), we nd a positive
correlation between marriage market competition (SR) and the level of the Eect (SMR-1). The
result is an evidence of the correctness of marriage selection hypothesis.
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